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Case No. 7183 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
RALPH REID and MILT STAMOULIS, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
OLUF H. ANDERSEN, ELLEN M. AN-
DERSEN, his wife; and S. M. KALM, 
d.b.a. KALM & SON REAL ESTATE 
COMPANY and STERLIN.G G. WEB-
BER, 
ReSJ]JrOndents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS ANDERSEN 
Appeal from Third District Court 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
H{)n. A. H. Ellett, Judge 
~~ T T fl'O!t, . & ARMSTRONG, ~ .h ~- 1 _~; 1, ~o :: eys f<tr Respo'fbdents 
n ersen, 
JUL 12 1948Salt Laroe City, Utah 
....._. ____________________________ _ 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
RALPH REID and MILT STAMOULIS, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
OLUF H. ANDERSEN, ELLEN M. AN-
DERSEN, his wife; and S. l\1. KALM, 
d.b.a. KALM & SON REAL ESTATE 
COMPANY and S'TERLING G. WEB-
BER, 
Case No. 
7183 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEN'TS ANDERSEN 
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
Appeal by plaintiffs from dismissal on demurrer of 
their amended complaint which p~ayed a declaration of 
rights as to specific performance (or damages) against 
defendants Anders~en upon an alleged $10,000 sales agree-
ment of Salt Lake City land signed by only one plaintiff, 
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2 
Reid, as buyer and by Andersen alone, as seller, and 
not by his wife. 
Plaintiffs joined Kahn and Son, a real estate bro~er 
and Webber, a s~alesman, as 1 defendants notwithstanding 
they manifestly had no concern in the controversy be-
tween the buyer and s·eller strictly over specific per-
formance or damages. The broker and salesman only 
received and held a $500 down payment which Reid left 
with them in attempting to make the purchase. 
T·he broker and salesman did no1t defend. Defendants 
Andersen filed separate demurrers for uncertainty, mis-
joinder and non-s·eparation of causes of action, mis-
joinder of parttes, ·and insufficiency of the complaint. 
The demurrers were sustained with leave to amend 
against Andersen but without leave as against his wife 
who had not signed the agreement. 
Dismissal on the merits was entered in the wife's 
favor March 2,1948. ('Tr. 56). 
Plaintiffs refused to amend and proce·ed against 
Andersen. The allowed time passed and the action was 
dismissed as to him also. ( Tr. 64). 
Later, although they did not defend and were in 
default, judgment of dismissal was ·entered in favor of 
Kalm mid Webber ('Tr. 66). They were not repres·ented. 
Defendants Andersen did not procur in any manner 
their disillissal. It must have be·en ·entered at plaintiffs 
instance. 
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Plaintiffs appeal from the _three dismissal judg-
ments: ( 1) the dismis·sal in favor of the wife who did not 
sign the contract, (2) the dismissal afterward in favor 
of Andersen as against whom plaintiffs deliberately re-
fused to plead over and to correct by amendment the 
misjoinder of causes of action and parties etc., pointed 
out, and which might readily have be€n done, the court 
having extended them the opportunity, and, ( 3) 'the dis-
missal as against Kalm and Webber which plaintiffs pro-
cured apparently themselves. 
But this is the brief of def€ndants Anders·en. As to 
the dismissal of Kalm and Webber ,they ·are not con-
cerned. Their only concern is jilie dismissal in, favor of 
themselves. These were proper as will be shown. They 
must be affirmed. 
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n 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ALLE'GED 
The amended complaint (petition) must be analyzed. 
It states: 
1. The residence of defendants. (Tr. 33). 
2. That Kalm and Son and Webber were, 
on information and belief, agents for defendants 
Andersen under a listing contract, the contents 
of which.are unknown. 
3. The description of the land. 
4. That Andersen acquired the land from 
a named grantor and on information and belief 
that his wife's only interest is statutory and in-
choate. (Tr. 34). 
5. On information and belief, Andersens 
authorized the broker to secure a purchaser for 
$10,000 and to accept $500 down. 
6. That on or about May 31, 1947 the Plain-
tiffs agreed to pay $10,000 cash for said property. 
That said terms were agreeable to the Defendants 
Oluf H. Andersen and Ellen M. Andersen, and 
that said acceptance thereof is evidenced by a 
certain Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement, 
bearing date of May 31, 1947, a copy of which 
is attached hereto marked Exhibit ''A'' and by 
reference made a part hereof. 'That Plaintiffs 
made a part payment, and there was part per-
formance of said agreement by Plaintiffs paying 
$500, to the aforesaid agent, which was duly ac-
cepted and received, for and on behalf of the 
Defendants Andersen and Andersen. Upon accept-
ance of the $500 down payment, Plaintiff allege 
upon information and belief, that they received 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
constructive, if not actual, possession of the prop-
erty which was merely an unenclosed vacant lot. 
Pursuant to said possession Plaintiffs went on 
to the land and formulated pJans and specifica-
tions for construction of a building thereon. That 
the only thing remaining to be done by Defend-
ants Andersen and Andersen was the execution 
of final transfer papers, there being no fuPther 
negotiations contemplated and the deal was closed. 
That ''possession'' was expressly ''given im-
mediately on closing," as shown by Plaintiff's 
Exhibit "A". (Tr. 34). 
S t 7. Upon information and belief Plaintiffs 
t r allege that Defendant Ellen M. Andersen agreed 
r i to all of the terms and conditions of the S'ale and 
1 a told Defendant Oluf H. Andersen, her husband, 
c l in the presence of Defendants S. M. Kalm and 
k Sterling G. Webber that she approved of the 
e c terms and that the entire transaction was agree-
n ° able to her. Pursuant thereto the Defendant Oluf 
u H. Andersen signed the Earnest Money Receipt 
b r and Agreement at his home and in the presence 
Y t of his wife, but the Defendant Ellen M. Ander-
Tr. sen did not personally sign. said Earnest Money 
42- Receipt and Agreement for the reason that she 
55. was not requeJsted to sign,l but upon information 
and belief Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Kalm 
and Webber signed for and on behalf of Defend-
ant Ellen M. Andersen as "agents". That al-
though said purchase price is a fair and reason-
able figure for said property, Plaintiffs believe, 
and therefor allege upon information and belief 
that_ said refus,al to convey is based upon the 
fraudulent intent of the Defendant Oluf H. An-
dersen :to avoid conveyance to the Plaintiffs and 
accept a higher offer which he may have received 
since entering into the agreement herein alleged. 
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8. That plaintiffs tendered and hereby 
tender the $9500 balance but Andersens refuse to 
a-ccept and convey. 
9. That plaintiffs are partners and Reid 
acted for the partnership in signing the Earnest 
Money Receipt. · 
10. That Defendants brought the abstract of 
title up to date and delivered it to Plaintiffs for 
examination. That suggested additional entries 
were made by Defendants and the title approved 
by the Plaintiffs. That Plaintiffs acted in good 
faith in entering into this agreement, and relied 
upon the representation that a good marketable 
title would be conveyed evidencing the sale. After 
making the part payment afore~aid, and taking 
posses1sion, Plaintiffs went to a great expense 
preparing to build on said property and have in-
curred great expense in the purchase of materials 
and incurred obligations for the construction of 
a ·building on said property. That Plaintiffs have 
been or will be damaged irreparably and in ex-
cess of the purchase price of s'aid land, unless 
specific performance is ordered hy the court. That 
the market value of said property is subject to 
broad fluctuation and therefore time is the es-
sence of this aetion. 
10. (sic) That $750 is a reasonable attorney's 
fee to be awarded Plaintiff's attorney for ser-
vices in this action if no appeal is taken. 
11. Plaintiffs are uncertain about their rights 
and therefore petition for a de-claratory judgment 
against the defendants. 
WHEREFORE : Plaintiffs pray for a de-
claratory judgment : 
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1. 'Yhether plaintiffs are entitled to specific 
performance and a conveyance. (Tr. 36). 
2. If not entitled to s·pecific performance 
from both defendants Andersen, whether plain-
tiffs are so entitled from Andersen alone, sub-
ject to the wife's statuto~y dower with abatement 
of the purchase price to cover her subsequent as-
sertion thereof or indemnity against the same. 
3. If not entitled to specific performance 
whether plaintiffs may have damages. 
4. And if so, what items and amounts are 
payable by which defendants. 
5. For such further declaratory statements 
of rights as may be proper, and further relief, and 
for costs and attorney's fees. (Tr. 37). 
Attached to the amended petition was a 
printed copy of the alleged sales agreement de-
nominated ''Earnest Money Receipt and Agree-
ment. '' ( Tr. 38). 'This contains two separate in-
dependent parts or agreements: (1) first a sepa-
rate receipt signed by Kalm and Company, only, 
to Reid (not Andersens~) in which Kalm acknowl--
edges he has received $'500 from Reid, ( Andersens 
are nowhere mentioned), and, ( 2) a separate 
agreement at the foot of the page following the 
receipt and signature of Kalm and wholly apart 
therefrom signed by ·Reid and Andersen only, 
(not by his wife). The receipt and agreement pro-
vide: 
THE RECEIPT. Kalm acknowledges he 
has received from Reid $500 to secure and apply 
on the purchase price of vacant property at 
Southeast corner Main and Hollywood Avenue, 
99 x 111 ~' for $9,000, the balance $8,500 to be 
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paid on acceptance and de}ivery of deed, pos-
session to be given immediately on closing etc., 
etc. If seller does not approve in five days re-
turn of the $500 by the broker cancels the sale. 
Seller agrees to pay Kahn his commission. (Tr. 
38). 
(Signed) K'Ol!m & Son R1eal EsM.t·e Agent 
by (Signed) Sterlitng G. Webber 
'THE AGREEMENT. We do hereby agree 
to carry out and fulfill the terms and conditions 
on the above receipt specified, the seller agree-
ing to furnish a good marketable title with ab-
stract to date, or policy of title insurance at the 
option of the seller and to make final conveyance 
by sufficient deed. If either party fails so to do, 
he agrees to pay the expenses of enforcing this 
agreement, including a reasonable attorney''S fee. 
I will accept. $10,000 
Cash 
)sl 0. H. Andersen 
Seller 
x f's I Ralph Reid 
OK )s I Ralph Reid 
Purchaser 
Approved Salt Lake Real Estate Board 
(Tr. 38) 
'The trial court sustained the separate demurrers of 
defendants Andersen. This as we will see was proper. 
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III 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Amended Petition Was Uncertain AS' To 
Whether Plaintiffs Relied Upon A Cause Of 
Action Upon A Written Contract Affecting 
Only Andersen Or Upon A Ca;.use Of Action · 
On An Oral Contract Mf,ecting Only His Wi:fie. 
The code provides that defendants may demur to a 
complaint "when one or more of the following objec-
tions thereto appears upon the face thereof": 
''That the complaint is ambiguous, unintel-
ligible or uncertain." §104-8-1 (7). 
Defendants Andersen filed separate identical de-
murrers. Each alleged: 
3. That said amended petition is. uncertain 
in that it cannot be as1certained therefrom whether 
there is attempted to be pJeaded therein ( 1) a 
cause of action upon a written agreement for the 
sale of real property, or, ( 2) a cause of action 
upon an oral agreement for sale of real property 
and part performance thereunder by the vendees, 
-the one cause of action affecting only defend-
ant Oluf H. Andersen and the other affecting 
only defendant Ellen M. Andersen. (Tr. 44, 50). 
The ground selected was plain. Taking the whole 
complaint it showed (1) that Andersen signed up with 
Reid, but, ( 2) that his wife did not sign. The copy at-
tached shows this plainly. (Tr. 38). 'The complaint con-
fesses it by the odd ~allegation that: 
''Ellen M. Andersen did not personally sign 
said Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement for 
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the reason that she was not requested to sign.'' 
(Tr. 35). 
So we have a complaint for specific performance (or 
damages) charging in a single statement that (1) one 
defendant, Andersen, signed a contract to sell, but, (2) 
that his wife did not sign,-and seeking relief as against 
both. 
If the complaint contained a cause of action against 
Andersen it could only be upon the writing that he signed. 
But if it contained one against Mrs. Anders·en, his wife, 
it was upon her oral agreement as charged in the com-
plaint by the statement "that defendant Ellen M. Ander-
sen agreed to all o{ the terms and conditions of the sale 
and told defendant Oluf H. Andersen, her husband, in 
the presence of defeJ?.dants S. M. Ka:lm and Sterling G. 
Webber that she ,approved of the terms and that the en-
tire transaction was agreeable to her,'' coupled with an 
attempted charge of part performance ''that plaintiffs 
made a part payment and ther.e was part performance" 
etc. (Tr. 3'5, 34). 
The two alleged obligations arise upon distinct agree-
ments. His upon a writing. Hers upon an oral undertak-
ing. They are even controlled by d.if£erent statutes of 
limita~ion. His six years. Hers four years. §104-2-22, 
§104-2-23. 
'The code declares that uncertainty is a ground of 
demurrer, and this court has held it is. 
''Ordinarily the remedy for uncertainty or 
unin~elligihility in a pleading lies in a special de-
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murrer which is equivalent to a motion to make 
more certain, and not in a motion to strike.'' 
Bamberger Co. vs. Certified Prodtu.ctions Inc., 
88 U. 213,53 P. 2nd 1153. 
The complaint was wholly uncertain as to whHther 
the cause of action claimed was upon a written or an 
oral contract. The demurrer upon that ground was prop-
erly sustained. 
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2. There Was A Misjoinder Of Causes Of Action. 
They wer.e Not Sepamtely Stated. They Did 
Not Affect All The Parties To The Action. 
·The ·code provides that several causes of action may 
be joined (united) in the same complaint, specifying 
them, hut concludes as follows : 
''But the causes of action so united must all 
belong to one of these classes and ·except in ac-
tions for the foreclosure of mortgages and of 
other liens must affect all the parties to the 
1action, must not require different places of trial, 
and they must be sep:arot;,ely stated. §104-7 -3. 
The code also provides as ground of demurrer: 
''That several causes of action are improp-
erly united; or, are not separately stated.'' §104-
8-1 (5). 
We have seen that plaintiffs attempted to plead two 
distinct causes of action ( 1) one against Andersen on 
the written agreement, and, ( 2) anoth·er against his wife 
on an oral agre~ment and part performance. The plain-
tiffs claimed oddly enough throughout the, pJeading that 
the writing affected both Andersen and his wife. Plain-
tiffs were not particular on which claim they might 
succeed if only the court would hold Andersen and his 
wife, both, in some way. • 
Kalm and his salesman were joined too. And thus 
plaintiffs pleaded different claims, (1) against one or 
another or some of the defendants,. hut not all, a~d, 
(2) claims which were not separately stated. 
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But the code says that if different claims are joined 
(united) they must affect all the parties and they must 
be separately stated. And so defendants Andersen each 
demurred: 
'' 4. T.hat several causes of action are im-
properly united and are not separately stated 
in said petition, to wit : 
(a) One cause of action for specific per-
formance of the alleged written agreement, earn-
est money receipt afores1aid, and claimed by plain-
tiffs to affect both of- the defendants Andersen, 
and 
(b) Another and different cause of action 
for damages for breach of said written agree-
ment and affecting defendant Oluf H. Andersen 
only and not affecting defendant Ellen M. Ander-
sen and all other defendants to the action, and 
(c)' Another and different cause of action 
for specific performance of an alleged oral agree-
ment to sell real property and part performance 
thereof affecting defendant Ellen M. Andersen 
only, and not affecting defendant Oluf H. An-
ders•en and all other defendants to the action. 
(d) The three several causes of action afore-
said each affecting only Plaintiffs and defend-
ants Oluf H. Andersen or defendant Ellen M. 
Andersen, as the case may he, and not affecting 
all other parties to the action. (Tr. 45, 51). 
Ground (a) pointed out that plaintiffs claimed the 
amended petition charge~ ·an obligation by both Ander-
sen and wife upon the writing and that this claim af-
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fected said defendant•s only (not Kalm, and not Webber, 
too). 
Ground (h) demons·trated that plaintiffs (at least 
alternatively) claimed a distinct cause of. action for 
damages against Andersen upon the writing signed by 
lrim (not his wife) and this distinct claim, the demurrer 
showed, did not affect Andersen's wife; also, that it 
did not affem Kalm and Webber. In short, that it did 
not affect ~all the parties to the action. 
Ground (c) showed the complaint charged an oral 
agreement and part performance by and against the wife 
and this claim affected her only, not also her husband; 
and not Kalm and Webber, too. 
Ground (d) finally illustrated that the three claims 
above affected Andersen and his wife, or Andersen or 
his wife, as the case might be, but did not affect all 
other parties to the action also. (Kalm and Webber). 
And so the grounds noted were all within the pro-
visions of the code upon demurrer. The several claims 
were upon distinct obligations. One written. One oral. 
The claims were as against one or another or some only, 
but not all, of the defendants. They were packaged to-
gether in one ple·a; not separately stated. And each claim 
did not affect all the parties to the action. 
Since they were not separately stated the demurrer 
was good. And since they did not affect all the parties 
to the action the claims were not propedy united. For 
these improprieties the demurrers were properly sus-
tained. 
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3. There Was A Misjoinder Of Parties Deflend-
ant. 
We have seen the code provides that all claims united 
in a complaint must affect all the parties to the action. 
§104-7 -3. And that the several claims did not affect all 
parties, but only affected one or another or some of them ; 
not all. 
The code also provides as a ground of demurrer : 
''That there is a defect or misjoinder of 
parties, plaintiff or defendant.'' §104-8-1 ( 4). 
And so defendants Andersen each separately de-
murred: 
'' 5. That there is a misjoinder of p3:rties 
defendant, to wit, misjoinder (a) of defendant 
Oluf H. Andersen who is alleged to have signed 
and become a party to said alleged earnest money 
receipt, and (b) of defendant Ellen M. Andersen 
who is affirmatively alleged and shown not to 
have signed said agreement, and (c) defendant~ 
Kalm and W ehber who are not alleged or shown 
to have any interest in the subject matter of the 
action." (Tr. 45, 51). 
The demurrer in the particulars stated is self-prov-
ing. Anders·en is charged upon his written obligation-
the ·sales agreement which he signed. His wife did not 
sign. Her obligation, if any, can rest only upon the al-
leged oral promis·e by her and part perrormance by the 
plaintiffs. And Kalm and Webber were not parties to 
either of those alleged claims written or oral. 'They 
neither signed nor were parties to either. They were 
parties to a different and distinct writing: the receipt 
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which they gave Reid for the $500 down payment. The 
controvery over specific performance (or damages) 
can be waged only between the plaintiffs and d~fendants 
Andersen; not Kalm and W ebher. 
Thus misjoinder of defendants resulted by the com-
plaint. The wife cannot be joined upon the claim against 
her husband on the writing which it is said he signed; 
nor he upon her alleged oral promise. The two are dis-
tinct claims. 'They require distinct and separate suits 
against distinct and separate obligors. Kalm and Webber 
could not be joined with Andersen or wife upon the claim 
for specific performance (or damages). They could have 
nothing whatever to do with a conveyance which a court 
might order Andersen and wife, or either of them, to 
make to plaintiffs. Kalm and Wehber would not be par-
. ties to any such conveyance. And for obvious reasons 
they would ha~e no part in a judgment against Ander-
sen for damages for failure to convey. That judgment 
could run only in f~avor of plaintiffs and only against 
· Andersens, or one of them. 
And so the demurrer for misjoinder of parties de-
fendant was properly sustained. 
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4. Ellen M. Anderson . Did Not Sign The Agree-
ment. She Was Not A Party To It. 
Before discussing the next ground of demurrer ( un-
certainty of the alleged agency which it is claimed Ander-
sens had previously given the broker) we will discuss 
the wife's not having signed the written agre·ement. 
Her signature is not on the instrument. (Tr. 38). 
But plaintiffs are zealous in attempting to draw her 
into the writing (to avoid the bar of the statute of 
frauds) and, since she did not sign, they continually cast 
about for some means of putting a signature on the· writ-
ing for her. And so, ingeniously, they ~suggest that per-
chance Kahn's signature followed by the printed word 
"agent" might be implied as hers where K:alm signed 
on the line marked agent. Remember, they allege that 
she did not personally sign "for the reason she was 
not requested to sign.'' ( Tr. 3'5). 
But to try and get her on the writing in some way 
at least they go on to say, not positively-for that would 
commit them-but only evasively, that ''on information 
and belief plaintiffs allege that Kalm and Webber signed 
for and on behalf of defendant, Ellen M. Andersen.'' 
(Tr. 35). 
But assume for argument the wife ha;d actually 
authorized Kalm to sign for her. He did not so sign. H·e 
signed only the receipt. And he did not sign her n·ame 
at all. The usual agency signature would have been '' El-
len M. Andersen by Kalm & Sons, agent." Nor does he·r 
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name appear in the body of the receipt or the body of the 
contract below. 
The rule is: 
''If the agent merely adds the word 'agent' 
to his signature in a document, not otherwise 
manifesting that he is not a party, it is inferred 
that he alone is a party to the transaction.'' 
Restat·ement, Ag.ency §156. 
''Ordinarily the mere fact that a person adds 
to his signature a word such as 'agent,' 'man-
ager,' 'treasurer,' or the like, without stating that 
he is contracting in behalf of another, are not 
regarded as preventing a personal obligation from 
attaching to the signer; such words are deemed 
not to change the character or capacity of the per-
son signing, but to be merely descriptive of 'him, 
or, to use the legal term, descriptio personae.'' 2 
Am. Jur., Agency, §244. 
Furthermore, the receipt says it must he approved 
by the seller within 5 days: 
''This payment is made. subject to the ap-
proval of the seller and unless so approved within 
5 days from date hereof the return of the money 
herein receipted f;!hall cancel .this sale·,'' etc. ( Tr. 
38). 
Now Andersen subsequently 'Signed his approval in 
the 0ontract he low the receipt. (For $10,000.00, not 
$9,000.00, as the buyers had offered). But Andersen's wife 
did not. She did not sign her approval either personally 
or b,y agent. Yet if Kalm had been her agent to sell and 
sign why, if he signed for her in the receipt, did he not 
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al~o sign her required approval' He 'had Andersen sign. 
His approval was necessary. But her approval was not 
signed in person or by agent. She simply was never party 
to the writing. 
All that can be deduced is that Kahn was a real es-
tate agent as the descriptive term is generally under-
stood. He signed a receipt to Reid for the $500.00 down 
payment. And as all real estate agents. do on the printed 
form ''approved Salt Lake Real Estate Board'' ('Tr. 
38) this real estate agent signed and added the "de- . 
scriptive'' word ''agent.'' Of course, in law, Kalm be-
came an agent. Agent for Reid when Reid deposited the 
money with him. He was Reid's agent to ho~d the money 
to abide the sale or to return it if Andersen did not '' ap-
prove" within 5 days; or even to return it if Reid with-
drew his offer before Andersen aooepted and approved. 
Mrs. Andersen did not sign personally. Kalm did 
not sign for her. She was not a party to the ~sales agree-
ment. · 
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5. If Kalm Actually Was Agent For The Wife 
Tbe Alleged "Listing'' 'Contmct Was Not 
Pleaded With Piroper Oertainty. 
We have seen that Andersen's wife did not sign and 
that Kahn did not sign for her. 
But assume for argument that in signing his own 
name Kalm attempted to sign for her as the plaintiffs 
would imply. The demurrer as to those circumstances 
was well grounded, notwithstanding. 
Upon information and belief only, plaintiffs allege 
that before the sales contract was made Kahn & Web-
ber were agents of defendants Andersen,-
"for the purpose of selling or obtaining a 
purchaser." (Tr. 33). 
Furthermore, and only on information and belief, 
they stated that the alleged agency was in writing (as 
it must be under the statute of frauds §33-5-3 and 
§33-·5-4 (5) ), and that the agency was: 
"Evidenced by a 'real es~tate listing' con-
tract.'' ( T·r. 33). 
Then it is as,serted that Kalm & Wehber signed for 
Mrs. Andersen, presumably by authority of their prior 
agency to ''sell'' or ''obtain a purchaser'' as· ''evidenced 
by the real estate listing contract.'' 
Defendants Andersen demurred. The particular 
ground at this juncture was for uncertainty as to the 
alleged agency-listing agreement: 
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'' 1. That said amended petition is uncertain 
in that the terms, provisions and conditions, if 
any, of the alleged agency agreement referred to 
on information and belief in :Paragraph 2 and 
denominated 'real estate listing contract' are not 
alleged or set forth either positively or on in-
formatio~ or belief or at all." (Tr. 44, 50). 
The ground of objection was well founded. 
As to the wife plaintiffs sought to apply her signa-
ture to the agreement through that of Kalm, the broker, 
by authority of the alleged ''listing contract'' to ''sell or 
obtain a purchaser.'' But like those of otheli special 
agents the powers of real estate brokers are limited and 
to be strictly construed : 
''An agent authorized to sell real estate is 
generally deemed to be a special agent acting 
under a limited power rather than a general 
agent. He can have only the power to do those acts 
specifically named in his contract of agency. 
Moreover, his authority to sell is to be strictly 
construed.'' 2 Am. Jur., Agency, §142. 
And courts construe agency contracts for the ""Sale" 
of land as: 
''Merely authorizing the· agent to find a pur-
chaser and submit his offer to the principal for 
acceptance, ·and consequently as not empowering 
the agent to execute a contract of sale in behalf 
of this principal. This is, as a general rule, the 
construction put on the employment of profes-
sional brokers or real eSJtate agents.'' 2 Am. Jur., 
Agency,·§ 137. 
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Consequently, an ordinary contract for the employ-
ment of a real estate broker does not authorize him to 
sign a contract of sale for his principal. 
''A real~estate broker, under the ordinary 
contract of employment, has no implied authority 
to execute a contract of sale in behalf. of his prin-
cipal. Such authority must be expressly conferred 
upon him or necessarily implied from the terms of 
the particular contract .... Ordinarily, there 
is no implied authority to execute a contract of 
sale from a mere listimg of the property with a 
broker, even though the owner specifies the terms 
of sale, from a mere employment to find a pur-
chaser or to sell real estate.'' 8 Am. Jur., Brrokers, 
§61. (italics added). 
In Payne vs. Jennifngs (Va.), 48 A.L.R. 628, an 
owner "listed" his property with a real estate broker 
to ''·sell'' at $12,000.00, payable $3000.00 cash and the 
balance on specified terms, and ag~eed to pay a eommis-
sion. The broker found a buyer and signed a contract 
of sale for his principal. upon the terms required. But 
the owner renounced and refused to be bound. The court 
of appeals upheld him ruling that the re-al estate agent 
had no power to sign a ~sales contract. 
''A real estate agent is generally a .special 
agent of limited powers, and those dealing with 
him deal at their peril. Usually his only authority 
. 'is to secure a purchaser who will take the prop-
erty at a price fixed by the owner. He cannot, un-
less e~pr:essly or impliedly authorized, execute a 
contract of sale on behalf of his principal." 48 
A.L.R. page 631, Payne v<S. Jiennitngs, swpro. 
\ 
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The extensive annotation following the decision 
shows that the courts uphold the rule of the Fa,yn.e case. 
It explains that ordinarily a real estate broker has no 
power to sign a contract of sale. 48 A.L.R. 6'35; and that 
employment to "find a purehaser" of land will not auth-
orize the broker to sign a sales contract. id. 637; that 
the broker must have special authority. ~ id. 637; that 
mere authority to ''sell'' does not carry with it the right 
to make a contract, id. 638 ; nor does authority to accept 
and receipt for a deposit, id. 644; and the mere "listing" 
of the property with a broker will not authorize him to 
sign a contract of sale. id. 641. 
Plaintiffs alleged, but only on information ·and belief, 
that Andersen and wife engaged Kalm & Webber as 
their agents to "sell" or to "obtain a purchaser" and 
that they did so in the alleged "listing" contract. Then 
they assert Kalm & Webber signed for the wife as her 
agents. But it is not alleged that the agency-listing 
agreement contained authority for the broker to sign 
a contract of sale for Mrs. Andersen. Lacking that 
indispensable allegation the statement that Kahn did 
sign in her behalf was futile as the authorities show an 
agency merely to ''sell'' or to ''obtain a purchaser'' doe's 
not authorize a broker to sign a sales contract; nor does 
a m·ere ''listing'' agreement give that authority. 
That is all that was alleged. And this the plaintiffs 
stated by indirection and not positively - only upon 
information and belief. True, they claimed the excuse 
that they could not ''specifically set forth the contents 
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thereof" because, so they alleged, the same was "within 
the knowledge and possession of the defendants". But 
they did not state that they themselves did not know 
those contents. They might have known them well, .even 
though the listing agreement was in the possession of 
the defendants. 
And while free and ready to make charges through-
out the complaint only on information and belief, why 
did plaintiffs stop here~ Why didn't they go on and 
allege that this phantom listing-agency contained "on 
information and helief'' a provision raruthorizing Kalm 
to enter into a contract of sale for Mrs. Andersen and 
to sign her name thereto. But they did not. We wonder 
why. 
So the special demurrer challenged for uncertainty 
the allegations about the purported written agency in 
not setting forth its terms. It wa;s well taken as we 
have seen. And as will next be shown, this deficiency 
was a mortal one and the attempt to charge the wife 
upon the written sales contract thereby failed to state 
a cause of action as against her. 
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6. The Complaint Did Not State A Cause Of Ac-
tion As To The Wif,e Upon The Written Agree• 
ment Which She Did Not Sign. 
"\V e have just seen that the demurrers for uncer-
tainty were good as against the allegation that Kalm 
signed for ~Irs. Andersen tmder the claimed authority 
of an alleged prior agency-listing agreement because it 
could not be detected whether Kalm was authorized 
therein to sign a contract of sale for Mrs. Andersen. 
And since plaintiffs did not allege any of tho'Se terms it 
was not asserted-not even on information and belief-
that any term or provision of the alleged agency auth-
oriz~d Kalm to sign_ for her. 
True, they claimed (on information and belief) that 
she "listed" the property for "sale" with Kalm to "ob- . 
tain a buyer''. This is all they charged.· But as we hav,e 
already seen, "listing" property with an agent to "sell'' 
or to "obtain a purchaser'' does not authorize him to 
sign a contract of sale for his principal. 
Thus, the result of the charge was that Mrs. Ander-
sen authorized and listed the property with Kalm to 
find a purchaser or to sell, but that she did not empower 
him to sign any contract of sale ; hut that he signed one 
anywa;y. This ingenious charge defeats itseU and the 
complaint thus failed to state a cause of action upon 
the written contract as against Mrs. Andersen. Her 
general demurrer thereto was properly sustained. 
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7. M:M. Andersen's Alleged Oral Agreement Was 
Barred By The Statute Of Frauds. 
Seeking to hold Mrs. Andersen also by way of al-
leged oral ~greement, plaintiff asserted that she orally 
consented to the alleged sale: 
'' 7. Upon information and belief plaintiffs 
allege that defendant Ellen M. Andersen agreed 
to all of the terms and conditions of the sale and 
told defendant Oluf H. Andersen, her husband, 
in the presence of defendants S. M. Kalm and 
Sterling G. Webber that she approved the terms 
and that the entire transaction was agreeable to 
her." (Tr. 3'5). 
Now the statu~e of frauds provide's : 
''Every contract . . . for the sale of any 
lands or any interest in lands shall be void un-
less the contract or some note or memorandum 
thereof is in writing subscribed hy the party by 
whom the ... sale is to be made, or by his law-
ful agent thereunto authorized in writing.'' 
§33-5-3. 
Attempting to avoid the statute of frauds as to 
Mrs. Andersen and her alleged oral consent, plaintiffs 
also averred: 
''That plaintiffs made a part payment, and 
there was part performance of said agreement'' 
etc. ('Tr. 34). 
Also, 
''That defendants brought the abstract of 
title up to date and delivered it to pJaintiffs for 
examination. That suggested additional entries 
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were made by defendants and the title approved 
by the plaintiffs. . . . Plaintiffs went to great 
expense preparing to build on said prope:rty and 
have incurred great expense in the purchase of 
materials and incurred obligations for the con-
struction of a building on said property.'' ( Tr. 
35). 
These allegations, plaintiffs hoped, might take them 
around the statute of frauds under the part perform-
ance ·section which reads : 
"Nothing in this chapter contained shall be 
construed to abridge the powers of courts to com-
pel the specific performance of agreements in 
case of part performance thereof.'' §33-5-8. 
Here, let us point out that part performance applies 
only in suits for specific performance. The statute· ex-
pressly says so. It is not available in actions for dam-
ages. This court has held so : 
"Since the second count of the complaint is 
based on a breach of the oral agreement to sell the 
land, and is an action at law. for money damages, 
the doctrine of par.t performance is not avail-
able to plaintiff." Baugh vs. Darley, (Utah) 184 
Pac. 2nd 335. 
So the charge of the wife's oral consent was insuffi-
cient as a claim for damages against her and her general 
demurrer was good in that regard. 
And as a claim for specific performance. against her 
it fares no better. The part performance claimed was: 
(1) part payment of $500.00 to Kalm (Tr. 34;) (2) that 
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plaintiffs actually went on 'the land and formulated plans 
to bui~d; (3) that defendants, not plaintiffs, brought the 
abstract of title up to date and delivered it to plaintiffs 
for examination, and defendants made additional entries 
therein ·and plaintiffs approved the title, ( Tr. 35) ; and 
( 4) that plaintiffs went to expense preparing to build 
and incurred expense for materials and construction. 
These alleged acts are insufficient. If pro¥ed they 
would not support ·specific performance of an oral agree-
ment. Part payment will not suffice. 
''A person acquires no equity in law that can 
be enforced in a court of equity by a parol pur-
chase, with a vp,a.rt payment 10f the purchase 
money." Maxfield vs. W,est, 6 U. 327, 23 Pac. 754. 
Williston affirms the rule : 
"It is true that payment of a pecuniary con-
sideration by the buyer is not generally held suf-
ficient justification for ·enforcing specifically an 
oral contract to convey land, the purchaser being 
left to his quasi contractual remedy of recover-
ing back what he has paid." Willist1on ·on Con.-
tra.cts, Rev. Ed. §494. 
Formulating plans is not part perfo·rmance. These 
are merely preliminary or preparatory acts. Prelimin-
ary or preparatory acts are insufficient. 49 .A.m. Jur., 
Statube of Fromds, §431. Formulating plans is not un-
like the preliminary act of making and securing esti-
mates of cost of. ·an improvement. This is not enough. 
101 .A..L.R. 967. ·The note there says.: 
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''Making estimates of the cost of an improve-
ment is not a part performance." lOI .A.L.R. 967. 
And the charge that the abstract was brought up 
and delivered to plaintiffs is no better. 
''Nor does the preparation or delivery of ab-
stracts of title constitute a part performance of 
such a contract.'' lOl.A.L.R. 966. 
It is asserted that defendants, not pl'aintiffs, pro-
cured the abstracts to date. But acts of a defendant 
cannot constitute part performance. They must he per-
formed by the plaintiff. 101 .A.L.R. 971. 
Simply preparing to build, being preparatory and 
preliminary, is -also insufficient. 49 Am. Jur., Statute: of 
F'rauds, §431. And incurring expense for materi~ls and 
construction is only preparatory also and is insufficient. 
Moreover, the allegations of part performance· are 
fatally deficient. 
''It is well settled that the aets of par~t per-
fl>rmance by the plaintiff, in order to entitle him 
to the specific performance of an oral contract for 
the purchase of real estate, must have been· per-
formed with the ktnowledge and consent or ac-
quiescence of the defendant.'' 101 .A.L.R. 971. 
This is because the basis of the doctrine or part 
performance is fraud or inequitable conduct of a de-
fendant. 
''Since the basis of the doctrine of part per-
formance is fraud or inequitable conduct on the 
part of the person sought to be charged on the 
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oral contract; it is well settled that the acts of 
part performance by the plaintiff, in oTder to en-
, title him to the enforcement of an oral contract, 
must have been performed with the kn;owledgle wnd 
consent or 1acquiesoence of the defendant.'' 49 
Am. Jur., Btatut.e of Fr.auds, §432. 
Plaintiffs do not allege that the wife knew they were 
"formulating pl'ans to build" or that she knew they had 
gone to expense "preparing to build" or had "incurred 
expense for materials and construction.'' . There is no 
, charge that she knew anything about these alleged acts 
of part performance-insufficient as they were. But 
had they be·en sufficient the alleged acts hy plaintiffs 
do not save the charge from the· statute of frauds, for 
it is not alleged that they were done with her knowledge 
or cons·ent. 
Furthermore, it is held that possession is· necessary 
to sustain part performance. 49 Am. Jur., Statute of 
FraiUJds, §433. Plaintiffs' allegations. here are contradic-
tory and must be resolved against them for the burden 
is on them to allege a sufficient case of part perform-
ance.. Rargrreaves vs. Burton, 59 1U. 5'7'5, 206 P.ac. 262. 
Plaintiffs say (again on information and belief) ''that 
they received oonstructime, if not actual possession, of 
the property." (Tr. 34). Also, that after making the part 
payment "and taking possession" they did the acts of 
part performance. (Tr. 35). 
In one place they allege they had possession; in 
another that they; had only const-ructive possession. The 
latter belies the former. Actual possession is necessary 
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and they have not charged it. The burden was on them 
to allege sufficient part performance. Hargreaves v·s. 
Burton, supra. They have failed to do so. 
The alleged oral agreement was harred by the statute 
of frauds. The acts of part performance claimed were 
insufficient to save it from the statute. The general 
demurrer of Mrs. Andersen was, therefore, properly 
sustained. 
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8. The AllegatJ110ns Charging Oral Consent Were 
Stricken By The Trial ·Court. 
We have se·en that Mrs. Andersen's demurrer to 
the eharge that she orally consented to the sale was well 
taken for insufficient supporting allegations of part per-
formance. 
So far we have considered the charge of oral con-
sent as if it were a~tually part of the complaint. But 
actually it is not; and it was stricken by the court on 
motion of Mrs. Andersen. She moved to strike,-
'' 3. The following in paragraph 7 : 
''Upon information and belief plaintiffs al-
lege that defendant Ellen M. Andersen agreed to 
all of the .terms and conditions of the. sale and 
told defendant Oluf H. Andersen, her husband, 
in the presence of defendants S. M. Kahn and 
Sterling G. Webber that she approved of the 
terms and that the entire transaction was agree-
able to her. Pursuant thereto· the defendant Oluf 
H. Andersen signed the Earnest Money Receipt 
and Agreement at his home and in the presence 
of his wife, but the defendant Ellen M. Andersen 
did not personally sign said Earnest Money Re-
ceipt and Agreement, for the reason that she was 
not requested to sign.'' ( Tr. 42). S'ee also P. 5 
herein). 
The motion was granted and the allegations were 
'Stricken. ( Tr. 55). Appellants assign error in the court's 
striking ·thi·s out. But they do not argue the assignment. 
The error, if any, is therefore waived under the 1ong 
established rule. 
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Hence, while we have earlier treated the complaint 
as if the stricken allegations remained, actually they 
are gone and the entire charge of 'Oral consent has wholly 
failed. 
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9. nemurrer Is A Proper Pleading In Declaratory 
Actions. 
""Where the declaration, complaint, or peti-
tion shows on its face that the contract is not in 
writing as required by the statute, a demurrer 
is a proper method of raising th~ defense of the 
statute of frauds." 49 Am. Jur., St,atute ·of 
F tratUds, §603. 
But plaintiffs imply that demurrer .. has no office in 
declaratory suits. 'This is remarkable. The chapter gov-
erning Declaratory .Actions is part of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. It is contained therein. §104-64-1. It is the 
uniform Declaratory Judgment .Act. Martindale-Hubbell, 
Utah Law Digest, Judgments. See id., Part VI, .Appen-
dix, Uniform .Acts, for text of Uniform .Act. 
The Uniform .Act has no specific provision as to 
pleadings. 16 Am. JUtr., Declamlio,ry Judgments, §63. 
''It follows that proceedings under these 
declaratory acts are governed by the applicable 
established rules of pleading." 16 Am. Jur., De-
clarato'ry Jrudgments, §63. 
This court has recognized the· propriety of demurrer 
in declaratory suits. Millard Cown)ty vs. Millard Oownty 
D'f1aitnange-DiJstrict, 86 U. 475, 46 Pac. 2nd 423. 'The opin-
ion shows the case was considered on demurrer: 
'''The appealing defendants demurred to the 
co~plaint on the ground that there was a mis-
joinder of both parties plaintiff and parties de-
fendant. Such demurrers on the part of the realty 
corporations were overruled, and such rulings 
are assigned as error." 
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10. Other Considerations. 
Respondents demurred for uncertainty alleging that 
a copy of the Earnest Money Receipt was not attached 
to the amended petition as alleged. (Tr. 44, 50). None 
was attached to the copy served. We demurred to in-
sure completion of the record. But the record now shows 
a copy was actually attached to the original. ('Tr. 38). 
We confess this ground ( 2) of demurrer was not well 
taken. 
Plaintiffs imply, as we read their brief, that they 
were entitled to some ''declaration if not relief.'' Of 
course they received a declaration as to Mrs .. Andersen. 
It came in the form of a dismi~sal for want of any cause 
of action against her. But it was a declaration no less. 
Her dismissal declared they had no case against her. 
As to Andersen, they must not complain. They were 
given leave to plead over when his deD;lurr·er was sus-
tained. They refused. Dismissal followed. F'Or failure 
to amend when invited by the court they cannot com-
plain. The sustaining of Andersen's demurrer on the 
special grounds required plaintiffs to correct the mis-
joinder and other defects by amendment. They refused. 
Andersen's dismissal "declared" that their pleading was 
not in proper form as prescribed by the Code and that 
until plaintiffs conformed they had no right to ''declara-
tion or relief.'' 
Plaintiffs also make much of a plain typographical 
error in Andersen's demurrer. The last ground thereof 
alleged failure to ·state a cause of action. But through 
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inadvertence it was stated that no cause of action was 
stated against defendant Ellen M. Andersen. This should 
have been Oluf H. Andersen. Plaintiff.s urge that one 
party may not def·end on the ground that no action lies , 
against a co-party. This ordinarily is· the rule. We. con-
fess it. But the other grol1nds of demurrer stated by 
Andersen were well taken and the demurrer was sus- · 
tain·ed as it should have been. Furthermore any party 
may raise ~he question of insufficiency of a complaint 
to state a cause· of action, with or without a demurrer. 
Failure to state a cause of action may always be raised 
at anytime. 
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lll 
CONCLUSION 
This is a simple case of two plaintiffs claiming that 
a man signed a contract to sell lands, hut admitting al~o 
that his wife did not join in signing. The. case alleged 
is just that simple. Candor would command a recogni-
tion of the absolute barrier those circumstances impose. 
The wife cannot be held. And the true. facts cannot be 
dimmed. They blaze with brilliancy. Ev·en through the 
maze cast off by easy charges only on information and 
belief the facts shine out. Plaintiffs have no case against 
Mrs. Andersen and the trial court was forthright in dis-
missing her upon demurrer. 
As to Andersen, upon the a1'legations charged, plain-
tiffs have themselves to blame for their travail. They 
did not amend when Andersen's demurrer struck them 
down for the uncertainty, the misjoinder and improper 
union, the non-separation of causes of action and the 
other defects which abounded in their pleading. The 
court invited them to amend, but they refused. Their 
reason is apparent. They were determined not to pro-
ceed against Andersen without his wife, for the quality 
of interest in Utah land acquired without the joinder of 
a wife is dubious. Its only certainty is that it ~s most 
uncertain. 
Plaintiffs should have amended and proceeded 
against Andersen alone. Since they did ·not they are 
bound to abide the consequence and the trial court's 
dismis'sal as to him upon their defective pleading mu:st 
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stand. If plaintiff•s actually thought they could hold 
Andersen (and we ho:ld that in the circumstances dam-
ages would have provided the limit of their rights) then 
they should have am~nded and sued him alone upon a 
charge affecting him only. Or they should have dismissed 
and sued him over again alone. But they did neither. 
'Theirs was the choice. A choice ~ninfluenced by what 
Andersen might hope or wish. And now upon deliberate 
c;hoosing they find themselves before this bar with no 
justificati0n for appeal. Both respondents are dismissed. 
But Andersen, because plaintiffs deliberately refused 
to /properly plead (which is not to say, however, they 
would have been able to prove· their charges). But the 
fact r•emains they are out of court as to him hy reason of 
deliberate choosing. 
Respondents subinit: 
(1) The amended petition was uncertain as to 
. whether plaintiffs relied upon a caus.e of action on a 
writing affecting only Andersen, or upon an oral promi'Se 
affecting only his wife ; or upon the alleged writing on 
the claim that it affected both of them. 
( 2) There was a misjoinder of causes of action. 
They were not separately stated and did not affect all 
the parties. 'The demurrers pointed out that the plain-
tiffs claimed the pleading charged both Andersen and 
wife upon the writing; charged only Andersen thereon 
(not his wife), and that the alleged causes of action each 
would not thus affect all the parties to the action, but 
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only one or more or 'Some but less than all, including 
Kahn and Webber, too. 
(3) There was a misjoinder of defendants. Ander-
sen was sued upon an alleged writing; his wife upon 
an alleged -oral consent. This misjoinder of defendants 
is clear. Kalm & 'Vebber, too, were joined. They had 
no place in the controversy over specific :Performance 
or damages being waged between plaintiffs and Ander-
sen; certainly none in the controversy over the alleged 
oral promise of :Mrs. Andersen. 
( 4) ~Irs. Andersen did not sign and was not a 
party to the alleged contract of s8le. She did not sign it 
personally. Her name does not appear therein. The 
copy attached shows Kalm signed his own name and that 
he signed only the receipt to Reid acknowledging the 
$500.00 down payment. He did not 'Sign the contract of 
sale or approval. He only signed the receipt. His signa-
ture was on a printed line preceding the printed word 
agent. Adding agent did not alter his individual capa-
city. It was only "descriptive". The real contract had 
to be ''approved'' within 5 days by the seller. Andersen 
is alleged to have signed his approval. But Mrs .. Ander-
sen never did. 
( 5) But even if Kalm wa·s agent for Mrs. Andersen 
and had signed for her he was not authorized. 'The ex..: 
tent of his alleged agency was a "listing'' to "sell or 
obtain a purchaser.'' Without more he had no power 
to sign a contract of sale for Mrs. Andersen. The com-
plaint was uncertain for not alleging the terms of the 
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alleged agency for it could not be detected whether it 
contained authority for him to sign. Hence, the demur-
rers were properly sustained for uncertainty. 
(6) The complaint did not state a cause of action 
against Mrs. Andersen upon the writing which she did 
not sign because it did not charge-not even on infor-
mation and belief-that Kalm was authorized to sign for 
her. 
(7) Mrs. Andersen's alleged oral consent was bar-
red by the statute of frauds. The part performance 
eharged is insufficient. Bringing up abstracts, prepar-
ing to build, purchasing materials, etc., in contemplation 
of building are only prelUninary and preparatory acts. 
They are insufficient as part performance. And what is 
most important, it is not ~harged that Mrs. Andersen 
knew of those alleged acts. Possession, too, is necessary 
in part perfO'rmance cases. Plaintiff's contradict them-
selves. They say once they had possession, but again 
that it was only constructive. Actual posses'sion is nec-
essary. And the. burden to allege ,and prove sufficient 
part performance rests on plaintiffs. Hlargre,avies vs. 
Burton, supvna. The acts ~harged are insufficient and 
the posses:sion :alleged was only constructive. The alle-
gations are entirely confusing and contradictory. Plain-
tiff'S have not sustained the burden of pleading a clear 
case of part performance. 
(8) The allegations charging oral consent by Mrs. 
Andersen were stricken by the trial court. 'This stripped 
the pleading of any charge of oral consent by her. Ap--
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pellants do not argue the alleged error assigned. The 
striking was proper, but if wrongful the order stands 
for appellants' failure tn argue their assignment, and 
the stricken matter is not a part of the complaint. 
(9) Demurrer is a proper plea in declal"atory ac-
tions. 
(10) Plaintiffs claim that they were entitled to 
some ''declaration''. They have received it. The dis-
missal of l\Irs. Andersen for want of any case against 
her was a declaration as to that. And if they were stop~ 
ped short of a plenary declaration as to Andersen it was 
for their own folly in deliberately refusing to amend 
and proceed according to the rules of pleading to the 
point where a plenary declaration could result. 
(11) The case is simple. Two plaintiffs charge that 
a husband signed a sales contract. They admit his wife 
did not. Ensnarled in the legal uncertainty of the value 
of a judgment for specific performance (if recovera;ble) 
againsi the husband wifuout the wife, they endeavored 
to put her signature on that ~agreement which she did 
not sign or to hold her to an alleged ora1 consent by 
allegations incapable of overcoming the statute of frauds. 
Both attempts have failed. 
(12) Andersen and wife could never have been 
sued in the same action. A single cause of action against 
both on t'he writing would always fail against her because 
she did not sign and she would be dismis1sed. A suit 
with one cause of action against Andersen on the writ-
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ing ·and another against her on the oral consent would 
likewise frail for neither cause would affect the defendant 
not charged thereon. Neither cause of action would affect 
aU the parties to the action. The only possible way in 
which both could be ·sued was by separate actions ; one 
against Andersen on the alleged writing and the other 
against his wife upon her alleged of1al consent. But Kalm 
and Webber could not be party to either suit for then 
it would not affect all the parties to the action since 
Kalm and W ~b ber could not be involved in a controversy 
over specific performance or damages sought in favor 
of the p[aintiffs and against defendants Andersen. 
The demurrer1s were properly sustained. The judg-
ments of dismissal for no cause of aCJtion as against Mrs. 
Andersen and for refus·al to amend as against Andersen 
when the right was granted were correct. They must be 
affirmed with costs to_ respondents. 
July, 1948. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS & ARMS'TRONG, 
Att1orneys for Respondents 
Andersen, 
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